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Abstract
This paper quantifies some of the general equilibrium costs of inflation for the UK, under
the assumption that individuals hold cash to economise on ‘shopping-time’.  It tests
whether or not money balances tend to a finite number as nominal interest rates tend to
zero, and investigates how sensitive are the welfare implications of rates of inflation
above the Friedman rule to this test.  The paper then explores how uncertainties about the
shape of the money demand curve translate into uncertainties about these welfare costs of
inflation.  A key uncertainty is the existence of a satiation point for money balances.  We
show using Monte Carlo tests that without observations at nominal interest rates very
close to zero, the power of satiation tests can be very low.  This finding may also be
important for evaluating how/whether monetary policy could stabilise the economy in the
event of a shock large enough to require that nominal interest rates are driven to the
region of zero.3
HOW UNCERTAIN ARE THE WELFARE COSTS OF INFLATION?
1  Introduction
In a recent paper by Lucas, he writes:
“In a monetary economy, it is in everyone’s private interest to try to get someone else to
hold non-interest bearing cash and reserves.  But someone has to hold it all, so all of
these efforts must simply cancel out.  All of us spend several hours per year in this effort,
and we employ thousands of talented and highly-trained people to help us.  These person
hours are simply thrown away, wasted on a task that should not have to be performed at
all.” (Lucas, 2000, p247)
For a long time, at least since Friedman (1969), economists have known that the task
would not have to be performed at all if monetary policy acted to bring about a steady
state of zero nominal interest rates, where there is no penalty to holding cash.  (In such a
regime inflation would be equal to the negative of the real interest rate, the rate that
equalizes the return to holding cash and a risk-free real asset.)  Since then a number of
researchers have sought to quantify how much time (and utility) is “thrown away” as
nominal interest rates rise above zero.
(1)  But why all this effort, when the ‘optimal’
inflation rate has been worked out?  The interest stems from the apparent consensus in
modern monetary regimes that policy should aim at a positive rate of inflation.
(2)  Those
______________________________________________________________________________________
(1) Examples are Bailey(1956), Friedman (1969), Lucas (1994,2000), Wolman (1997), Chadha et al
(1998), Feldstein (1999) Bakhshi et al (1999), Dotsey and Ireland (1986), but there are many more.
(2) See, for example, Julius et al (2000), Haldane (1995), Mishkin et al (1999).4
regimes are predicated on the notion of setting the costs of staying away from the
‘Friedman rule’ on the one hand against the costs of lowering inflation further on the
other.
(3)  These costs of lowering inflation are highly uncertain, difficult to model
coherently, but could be important.  Leaving aside measurement problems
(4), researchers
have examined whether low inflation could cause problems if nominal wages or prices
are downwardly rigid.
(5)  And they have also sought to quantify the costs of monetary
policy becoming impotent as nominal rates hit the zero bound in regimes of very low
inflation.
(6,7)  Models tractable enough to calculate the costs of inflation are typically
simplified to the point where the economic behaviours that could generate these
‘benefits’ of positive inflation are not included.
(8)  So the interest in calculating the
welfare cost of positive inflation is a pragmatic one.  Absent an all singing, all dancing
model that includes a zero bound and downward nominal frictions, take a monetary
general equilibrium model, calculate the costs of positive inflation, and balance these in
an informal way against the ‘benefits’.
This paper adds to the literature on quantifying the costs side of the inflation ‘balance
sheet’.  It makes two distinct contributions.  First, it offers a UK calibration of some of
the general equilibrium costs of inflation that complements the efforts of Bakhshi et al
______________________________________________________________________________________
(3) Note that ‘Friedman rule’ is taken to refer to the notion that the optimal rate of inflation is the negative
of the real interest rate, rather than Friedman’s celebrated rule for achieving a given rate of inflation by
setting money growth equal to ‘k per cent’.
(4) See Cunningham (1996), Boskin (1996), for details of biases in price indices.
(5) See Akerlof et al (1996), Smith (2000), Yates (1998) for examples in this literature.
(6) See King and Wolman (1996), Fuhrer and Madigan (1994), Reifschreider and Williams (1999), King
(1999), Taylor (1999) for examples.5
(1999) and Chadha et al (1998) which took partial-equilibrium approaches.   The estimate
is a ‘general equilibrium’ one in the sense that, following Wolman (1997), it takes as its
benchmark a model of money demand due to McCallum and Goodfriend (1987), who
argued that individuals hold cash in order to economise on shopping-time.  In this model
a rise in nominal interest rates has two effects.  First, it lowers the return to working at the
margin, because individuals are unable to translate that work into the same amount of
consumption:  they either have to spend more time to shop for the same amount of
consumer goods, or they have to incur more interest costs.  Second, there is an income
effect.  The reduction in the real wage reduces lifetime wealth, so raises the marginal
utility of wealth and hence of working, so workers will work more as a result.
(9)  The
‘general equilibrium’ aspects of the costs of inflation come from accounting for these
effects on consumption and leisure decisions by households.
This approach to calculating the welfare costs of inflation is distinct from an older
literature that stretches from Bailey (1956), Sidrauski (1967), through Lucas (1994) and
most recently to Chadha et al (1998).   The intuition behind those papers was that just as
you can use the area under the demand curve for apples to calculate the consumer surplus
that accrues from apple consumption when the market clears at a certain price, so you can
do the same with money.  If the market for apples clears at a price of ten pence, then we
                                                                                                                                                                            
(7) Many of the papers in Feldstein (ed) (1999), including Bakhshi et al (op cit) also factor in the temporary
output loss that occurs when prices are (symmetrically) sticky, drawing on the literature on the costs of
disinflation:  see Ball(1990), Ball, Mankiw and Romer (1988) for example.
(8) An exception is King and Wolman (1996).
(9) For a given level of productivity and hence real wages, people cannot generate the same consumption-
leisure level as before.  Either they economise on real balances and spend more time shopping (having less6
know that the benefit from consuming the last apple is ten pence.  If the demand for
apples is downward sloping, then the benefit from consuming the next to last apple is
greater than ten pence.  By adding up all the marginal benefits along the demand curve
then subtracting the price we can calculate the total consumer surplus.  So with money.
If money is a consumption good then you can compare the area under the demand curve
for money when nominal rates are x per cent to when they are zero and thereby derive a
measure of the benefit of reducing steady state nominal interest rates.  In this older
literature money provides utility in and of itself.
10  This is not to suggest that proponents
of models of this class believe that individuals get pleasure from money directly, but
simply that the services money yields to facilitate household activities can be modeled as
if money were indeed a consumption good like any other.  In the shopping-time model,
money is modeled not as directly utility-providing but as enabling consumers to translate
work into consumption more efficiently.  So the fact that our paper offers a ‘general
equilibrium’ estimate of the welfare cost of inflation comes from the chosen shopping-
time model that tells us that inflation has consequences for consumption and leisure
decisions, whereas the ‘money gives you utility all by itself’ approach says that it does
not.
                                                                                                                                                                            
for either leisure or work), or they reduce lifetime income by suffering the increased erosion of their
monetary assets.
10 This literature typically assumes that agents’ money holding decisions are additively separable to agents’
leisure and consumption decisions.7
Our ‘general equilibrium welfare cost of inflation’ comes, following Wolman (1997),
from applying a shopping-time money demand function to UK data and combining it
with a model of consumption and leisure choice.
The second contribution of our paper is that we look at the uncertainties surrounding
those welfare costs of positive inflation we capture.  One dimension of this is to look at
how uncertainties surrounding our shopping-time parameter estimates (embodied in our
parameter standard errors) translate into uncertainties in the welfare calculation.  The
intuition we seek to confirm is that the more ill-determined are the parameters of the
estimated money demand equation, the greater, other uncertainties put to one side, will be
the uncertainty about the welfare costs of inflation.    Another dimension of uncertainty is
whether real money balances tend to a finite number or not at zero nominal interest rates.
Friedman (1969) argued, for example, that at some point, the costs of hiring security
guards to look after hoards of cash would mean that reductions in interest rates would not
increase real balances.  If, on the other hand, real balances tend to an infinite quantity
then a larger portion of the costs of positive inflation accrue in the first few percentage
points away from the Friedman rule than if they do not.  The argument has been at the
centre of the ‘money as a consumption good’ approach to calculating the welfare costs.
For example, Lucas (2000) and Chadha et al (op cit) both argue that lines that tend to
infinity at zero nominal rates (“log-log” curves) fit real money data better than those that
do not (“semi-log” curves).  Wolman (1997) develops a test of satiation interpretable
within the shopping-time model that we implement for United Kingdom data.  We also
explore how powerful these tests are when there are few – if any – observations at very8
low nominal interest rates.  Intuitively, if there are no observations near zero nominal
rates, then we cannot observe whether the real balances line tends to a finite number or
not.  We generate data under models of satiation and non-satiation, perform econometric
tests of satiation in these artificial worlds and look to see what happens to our inference
as we strip away observations close to zero nominal rates.
The rest of the paper will proceed as follows.  We begin in section 2 by setting out the
shopping-time model, though do so briefly as readers can turn to McCallum and
Goodfriend (1987) for a more detailed consideration.  We then set out in section 3 how
we calibrate the model for UK data:  beginning first with the estimation of the money
demand equation, and then turning to the calibration of other key parameters in the ‘real’
part of the model.  In section 4 we undertake our benchmark welfare analysis.  Section 5
discusses some uncertainties in our welfare analysis.  Section 6 concludes.
2  The shopping-time model of money demand
A key question is why we have chosen the shopping-time model of money demand
amongst other specifications.  We are forced at the outset to rely on those theoretical
approximations to microfounded money demand functions that have been successfully
integrated into general equilibrium models of the macro-economy.  The lessons learned
from the literature begun by Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) and the problems that have
defined its progress since then are ignored by this paper.9
The shopping-time model of money demand assumes that time and real money holdings
are (imperfect) substitutes for undertaking transactions that enable consumption.  The
model should not literally be taken to imply that “shopping” is more efficient with
money, but is a statement about money providing services to the holder which make all
activities involved in undertaking consumption- of which shopping is one- easier (or less
costly).  We might, for example, equivalently label the model “the liquidity management
model of money demand” arguing that the model is a device for approximating the fact
that real money holdings can help cut down the time required to manage transfers
between real and cash assets needed to finance consumption.
The model was formalised by McCallum and Goodfriend (1987) who employed a
specification suggested first by Saving (1971).  It is distinct from, but related to, models
where households require ‘cash in advance’ to finance consumption [for example, Lucas
(1980,1984)].  In the shopping-time model, agents can substitute (real) cash for time.  In
cash-in-advance models they can’t.  Cooley and Hansen (1989,1991) show how in a cash-
in-advance model agents respond to higher steady-state inflation (and therefore nominal
interest rates) by substituting consumption for leisure.  In the shopping-time model if
inflation rises, agents substitute away from holding cash towards devoting time to
‘shopping’.  Karni (1974) made just this point.  More recently, Aiyagari et al (1998) offer
models with a similar flavour which has consumers purchasing ‘credit services’ that help
consumers substitute from goods that require ‘cash in advance’ towards goods that can be
purchased with credit.  The shopping-time model is also related to the Sidrauski (1967) or
‘money in the utility function’ model.  In this model, as we outlined in the introduction,10
the inflation effect on money balance affects welfare, but not consumption.  Formally, the
term in money in the utility function is separable from those in consumption and leisure.
With some appropriate restrictions, the shopping-time specification is equivalent to a
“money in the utility function” model [see for example Croushore (1993)] but in general
it implies a ‘money non-separably (and indirectly) in the utility function’ functional form.
This gives rise to the more complex general equilibrium effects of inflation (on
consumption) that mean, as we have discussed, that estimates of the area under empirical
money demand curves are insufficient to capture the full effects of inflation, a point made
by many, including, for example, Dotsey and Ireland (1996).
Our choice to adopt the shopping-time specification is a pragmatic one.  Although it does
not approach the rigour of more properly microfounded approaches (like Kiyotaki-
Wright) it allows us to derive an empirically testable equation.  Moreover,  it does so in a
model that allows for a more subtle interpretation of the value of money than cash-in-
advance models, and one that allows us to explore general equilibrium effects of
inflation, which ‘money-(separably)-in-the-utility function’ models do not.   A final
advantage is one drawn out by Wolman (1997) who showed how the shopping-time
model can be used to derive a theoretically interpretable empirical test for ‘satiation’ in
real balances, that parallels the ‘log-log or semi-log’ debate in the papers by Lucas (1994)
and Chadha et al (1998) (amongst others).  One objective we have is to measure the
importance of the existence of a finite satiation point and to gauge the importance of
being unsure about it.  Wolman’s interpretation of shopping-time allows us to do just
that.11
Some support for a shopping- time specification can be found by looking at a plot of
inverse velocity and survey measures of shopping- time (Chart 1).  This does not depict
the structural relationship between money demand and shopping time in the shopping-
time technology (equation (4)), nor does it account for the many factors which have
exogenously changed shopping time.  We also acknowledge that the time measured in the
surveys may constitute ‘leisure’.  But the (weak) negative correlation between inverse
velocity of notes and coin and measures of shopping-time derived from time budget
studies is at least suggestive that that the assumed functional form for the shopping time
technology is not way off track.
Chart 1
Money demand and shopping 


















*various time budget studies12
The message to draw from this chart is that, though we have cautioned against employing
a too narrow or too literal interpretation of the shopping-time model, the data suggest that
our interpretation can at least include a literal one!
2.1  The shopping time technology and money demand
The shopping time technology, or the function that tells us how much shopping time is
saved per unit of real balances, is a crucial part of our paper and therefore needs some
discussion up-front.  Since the remainder of the model is standard, we focus on drawing
out the intuition of the shopping-time model and its importance for the shape of the
money demand relation.  This section follows King and Wolman (1996) and Wolman
(1997).
The shopping-time technology says that for a given level of consumption, shopping-time
can be reduced by holdings of real balances.   We further impose homogeneity so that
shopping time is a function of the ratio of money balances to consumption:








  for all t
Time spent shopping (or in leisure) is at the expense of time spent working, and therefore
the opportunity cost of a unit of shopping time is the real wage wt.  Agents maximise a
utility function which has terms in consumption and leisure time (specified below).  To
reduce the cost imposed by time spent shopping, agents can increase their money13
balances but this will be offset to a certain extent by the opportunity cost of holding (non-
interest bearing) money.  This is the value of interest forgone Rt, discounted from when
that interest would be received (ie next period), at rate  ()
1 1
− + = t R β .
Consumers choose shopping time and money balances so that the marginal cost of
holding a unit of money balances is balanced by the marginal benefit of reduced shopping
time (both measured in monetary units).  Formally:





















This expression implicitly defines the demand for money.  King and Wolman’s choice of
function form for ht’() nests different explicit forms for the money demand function.



























where, following Wolman’s notation, the parameter ν  is negative.  The nature of the
money demand function at very low interest rates therefore depends on whether φ =0 or
whether it is strictly positive.  At a zero nominal interest rate, money holdings are chosen
so that the marginal benefit (in reduced shopping time) is driven to zero.  If φ >0 then14
there is a finite level of money balances consistent with the efficiency condition at zero
nominal interest rates.  But if φ =0 the level of money balances consistent with the
efficiency condition will be infinite at zero interest rates.
With this explicit functional form for h’(), we can derive an explicit money demand curve


























We will fit this equation to UK data in section 3.
We shall also make use of the fact that the satiation level of money balances (as a share
of consumption) at zero nominal interest rates is 
ν φ A , which is infinite if φ  is zero since
ν  is assumed negative.
Once again, if φ >0 then there exists some positive level of real balances at which the
marginal benefit to consumers from holding money, accounting for the marginal
reduction in shopping time, is zero.  But although a satiation level of real balances is
definable in the context of a  shopping-time model, this does not establish the economic
plausibility of satiation, not least since the shopping-time model has to be thought of an
approximation of the microfoundations for money demand.  To illuminate the debate15
Wolman (1997) offers two competing quotes from Lucas and Friedman.  Thus  Lucas
(1994, p16) comments: “Managing an inventory always requires some time, and a larger
average stock must always reduce this time requirement, no matter how small it is.”  On
the other hand, Friedman (1969, p17) puts it “..[As nominal interest rates fall] the retailer
dispenses with an errand boy to economise on cash balances, which is a gain, but, at some
point, he must hire guards to protect his cash hoard.”
We do not form a prior about the plausibility of satiation, but follow Wolman in allowing
it to be decided by the data.
It is useful to note that this functional form for money demand can nest the log-log and
semi-log forms of the money demand equation familiar from other empirical studies.
Consider the case when the nominal interest rate is low enough for the approximation
R/(1+R)=R to be reasonable.  Taking logs of the money demand equation when φ >0  we
get:
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(Recall the parameter ν  is assumed to be negative).
If the constant φ =0 this approximation is no longer valid, but taking logs of (4) and
rearranging gives:
(7)  t t t t R w c A m ln ln ln ) 1 ( ln ln ν ν ν + − + + =
Given the functional form for ht’() the derivative of the shopping time function, it can be
integrated with respect to m/c to obtain the expression for shopping time h:






































































where h  represents the minimum possible shopping-time.
2.2  The standard problems for consumers and firms, Wolman (1997)17
The representative agent maximises utility subject to a budget constraint and a time
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j t c +  and  j t l +  are consumption and leisure respectively in period t+j.  β  is the agent’s
time discount factor.   j t P+  is the price level,   j t M +   denotes the agent’s nominal money
holdings,   j t B +  is the agent’s holdings of one-period zero-coupon nominal bonds,   j t R +  is
the nominal interest rate on these bonds,   j t w +  is the real wage,   j t n +  is the fraction of
time the agent spends working,   j t D +  denotes dividend payments from firms,   j t l +  is the
fraction of time spent as leisure,  and  j t h +  is the fraction of time spent shopping.


































h w P l c u c λ






+ + = +
j t j t
j t

















+ + + + + + + +
j t j t j t
j t
j t j t j t j t j t j t j t c P c
m





































The money demand equation (4) comes from manipulating the FOCs for money and bond
holdings [(13) and (12) respectively].
The representative firm maximises discounted expected future profits,  where the
discount rate for period t+j is the consumer’s marginal rate of substitution between a unit
of wealth in periods t and t+j [see equation (12)].  Formally, the firm’s problem is:
(14) () () 
∞
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where  j t a +  is the firm’s (multiplicative) productivity parameter at time t+j,  () .,. f  is the
firm’s production function (assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale),   j t k +  and  j t n +
are the firm’s capital stock and employment levels,   g  denotes labour-augmenting
technical progress (assumed exogenous),   j t w +  is the real wage that firms pay,   t i  is
investment and δ  is the depreciation rate of the firm’s capital stock.  Note that the model
we are adopting omits the possibility that money may help firms as well as consumers
economise on ‘shopping-time’.  We do so partly for simplicity and partly as a practical
matter, since only about 10% of cash in the UK is held by firms.  Other authors have
modeled firms’ money demand [see, for example, Fischer (1974)] separately, though not,
so far as we are aware, in the context of assessing the welfare costs of inflation.
(11)
The first-order conditions for the firm’s optimisation problem are therefore simply:
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______________________________________________________________________________________
(11) Our observation that only 10% of cash in the UK is held by firms is supportive of, but not proof of our
implied assertion that modeling firms is not important for the welfare costs of inflation.  This low
proportion will be an equilibrium response to the current inflation rate and could be one that implies a high
interest elasticity of demand (and a high welfare cost of positive inflation) for firms.20
Equation (15) is the standard condition equating the real wage and the marginal product
of labour.  Equation (16) is the firm’s first-order condition with respect to next period’s
capital stock.  It states that the increase in future profits associated with a higher capital
stock in the next period just offsets the decrease in current profits resulting from an
increase in investment.
3  A UK calibration of the shopping-time model
There are two important elements to our account of the UK calibration.  The first is to
describe the empirical work that gives rise to our calibration of the parameters in the
‘money demand’ equation, or the empirical counterpart of equation (4).  The second is to
describe our calibration of the ‘real’ part of the economy:  the parameters in the other first
order conditions.
3.1 Parameters in the money demand function
Our approach here follows Wolman (1997) in deriving estimates of the parameters A, φ
and υ  in the money demand function.  In doing so there are conflicting demands on our
methodology.  The first demand is that we need an equation that is interpretable within
our theoretical model.  Without this we cannot carry out our general equilibrium welfare
analysis.  The second demand is that we would like an equation that fits the data and21
specifically an equation that performs in a way that allows us to conduct inference.
Recall that one of our goals is to test whether or not there is a satiation point, which
amounts to testing for a zero value of φ .  If we were not interested in general equilibrium
analysis, we could depart from the theoretical specification and fit the data with a vector
autoregression.  If we were not interested in conducting inference on our parameters then
we could make do with imposing our theoretical equation on the data and proceeding.
Readers should interpret what we do here as an attempt to reconcile these conflicting
demands, rather than as a comment on the now enormous literature on empirical money
demand functions [see the survey by Goldfeld and Sichel (1990) and Chadha et al (1998)
for examples].
Chart 2 plots the two composite variables entering the money demand function in
equation (4) using historical data for the monetary base, consumption, earnings and
interest rates on 7-day deposit accounts in the United Kingdom from 1920 to 1998 (see
Appendix 1 for details).  The empirical problems that are likely to confront us in fitting a










Money demand, 1920-1998  m/c
(R/1+R)x(c/w)
We follow Wolman (1997) in deriving estimates of A, φ  and υ  using non-linear least
squares (NLLS) and in using a bootstrapping procedure to generate confidence intervals
around the central estimates which we can use to make inferences about satiation and to
construct estimates of the uncertainty surrounding the welfare costs of inflation.  The
bootstrapping procedure has the advantage that  we do not have to make distributional
assumptions about the error term when conducting inference.  (Note that the NLLS
estimates are consistent and asymptotically normal, though not efficient unless the error
term is normally distributed (see Amemiya (1985)).
(12)  So asymptotic results could be
______________________________________________________________________________________
(12) Of course this assumes that both the dependent and independent variables are stationary.  There is a








+  are stationary:  all sensible theories of consumer behavior predict
that money demand and consumption cointegrate, on the one hand, and that consumption and wage income
cointegrate on the other.  In fact, using standard ADF tests it is not possible to reject the null of non-
stationary at conventional significance levels.  But these tests have notoriously low power.  That is the case
with our data set too:  using Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (1992) tests, which test the null of23
used to justify using standard inference techniques to test the null of non-satiation).   The
procedure is described in Appendix 2.
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the equation we estimate is:
(17)  () t t t x A y ε φ
ν + + =
The table below reports the central NLLS estimates.
(13)  It also reports the two-sided 95%
confidence bands around these central estimates, as generated by the bootstrapping
procedure:
Table 1
Coefficient: A φφφφν ννν
Central estimate 0.005282 0.001655 -0.5980
Upper conf bound 0.01385 0.004375 -0.39473
Lower conf bound 0.0008533 0.0005094 -1.02321
                                                                                                                                                                            
stationarity, we cannot reject stationarity either (results available on request).  We proceed with the
assumption that both variables are indeed stationary.
(13) We experimented with different starting values for the parameters in our NLLS routine and found that
the estimates were robust.24
The estimate of φ  appears statistically significantly different from zero, echoing
Wolman’s result for the United States.  This implies that real balances tend to a positive
number at zero nominal interest rates.
(14)  For comparison we estimated equation (17)
imposing nonsatiation ( 0 = φ ), giving the following estimates:
(18) 
-0.2961 0.02243 t t x y =
These two fitted curves are plotted in chart 3 below.  Note that on inspection the curves
are extremely close to each other yet the economic implications of the two, in particular
the welfare costs of inflation, are qualitatively different.  Wolman (1997), in contrast,
finds that for the United States the unrestricted and restricted curves are markedly
different.  Indeed, later in the paper we will ask whether it makes much difference to our
calculation of the welfare cost of inflation whether or not real balances display satiation;
we are going to conclude, in short, that in the US it does, but in the UK it does not.
______________________________________________________________________________________
(14) Chadha, Haldane and Janssen (1998) do not reject the log-log specification for money demand using a
similar dataset to that used in this paper.  But they do express discomfort at the implication that this










Money demand, 1920-1998  m/c
(R/1+R)(c/w)
empirically estimated curve (unrestricted)
empirically estimated curve
(restricted)
Our hypothesis test rejects the null of nonsatiation in the UK demand for narrow money.
Our parameter estimates imply that at zero nominal interest rates, the ratio of money to
consumption equals 0.24.  This in itself is insufficient to tell us what the satiation level is
in current pounds per head.  To do that we need to calculate consumption at zero nominal
interest rates, and to do that we need to calibrate the remainder of our general equilibrium
model.26
3.2  Robustness of the empirical strategy
At this point we can usefully discuss two features of the empirical strategy.  First, our
response to the serial correlation in the errors.  Second, our use of single-equation NLLS.
It is a well-known property in the empirical money demand literature that equation errors
in a regression of the kind we estimated are significantly autocorrelated.  [Once again, see
Goldfield and Sichel (1990), Chadha et al or Hoffman and Rasche (1996)].  The serial
correlation in the residual is arguably a sign of model mis-specification.  Traditionally,
researchers have responded by including a lagged dependent variable (or many) in the
money demand function.  Such lags could be motivated by the argument that consumers
face costs in adjusting real balances, and allow us to preserve the usefulness of the
equation for our welfare analysis (without such a motivation extra variables in the money
demand equation would leave us unable to use it for the welfare calculation).  But
including a lagged dependent variable often fails to mop up the serial correlation
completely and, more fundamentally, it is difficult to think of adjustment costs that are
large enough to explain the high degree of serial correlation that is observed (see
Goodfriend (1985) for an exposition of these points).  Chadha, Haldane and Janssen’s
(1998) solution is to estimate an error correction model for money demand in the UK.
Their approach stresses a distinction between long-run and short-run money demand
where portfolio adjustment costs are used to justify the short-run (data-driven) dynamics.
This distinction may turn out to be theoretically valid.  For the moment, we have to rely
on an equation that coheres with the shopping-time model and on the notion that that27
model can capture the fundamental welfare implications of different steady states,
notwithstanding its inability, as currently specified, to capture all the dynamics.  An
alternative line of defence is offered by Goodfriend (1985).  He argues that stochastic
measurement error in the opportunity cost of holding money and in the scaling variable
(consumption in the shopping time model) can explain the observed serial correlation in
the money demand function.  So there is no need to rely on (implausibly high) portfolio
adjustment costs.  This argument would support using a theoretical model of money
demand with no adjustment costs,  such as the shopping time model used in this
analysis.
(15)
Note too that we used single equation NLLS.  Although it is clear that our model would
suggest that the regressors in the money demand equation (interest rates, consumption
and earnings) are themselves endogenous, implying that unless we instrument in some
way a single-equation method is inappropriate.  We arrived at the single-equation NLLS
strategy [like Wolman (1997)] after evaluating two other possibilities.   One was to use
GMM.  We experimented with a GMM procedure using a variety of instruments (lagged
values of the regressors) and, like Wolman (1997), found that the estimated coefficients
were highly sensitive to which instruments were used.  Without a theory to help guide our
choice of instruments GMM is therefore problematic.
(16)
______________________________________________________________________________________
(15) A reply by Laidler(1985) in the same conference is sceptical of this line of reasoning.
(16) The result that the estimates from the GMM procedure are sensitive to choice of instruments is not
new.  Mao (1990) and Nelson and Startz (1990) find that the performance of the GMM estimator and the J-
test of over-identifying restrictions is sensitive to the choice of the number of lags used in the instrument
set.  Fuhrer, Moore and Schuh (1995) report Monte Carlo evidence that GMM estimates are often biased,
dynamically unstable and economically implausible (wrongly-signed).  They also argue that the main
problem lies in the sensitivity of the results to the choice of instrument.  Holman (1998) discusses the pros28
Another alternative to our NLLS routine would have been to use a maximum likelihood
procedure.  Fuhrer, Moore and Schuh (1995) argue that ML estimates are generally
unbiased, dynamically stable and economically plausible compared with GMM estimates.
The problem in our case is that the residual from the money demand equation is far from
normally distributed, so any of the standard distributional assumptions about the error are
likely to be violated.
Given the uncertainties surrounding the empirical calibration of the money demand
function, we checked for robustness in two ways:  by changing the sample period, and by
allowing for a possible time trend in the shopping-time technology.
The observations nearest the origin (with low values of inverse velocity and low interest
rates) clearly worsen the fit of the empirically-estimated money demand curve.  These
observations all occurred in the 1990s when narrow money demand was historically low,
given the low levels of nominal interest rates that were prevailing.  One possibility is that
there is a change in some fundamental parameter that means the money demand equation
experienced a ‘structural break’ in the 1990s. We investigated the possibility of structural
breaks by re-estimating the satiation level implied by (4) over the sample period
                                                                                                                                                                            
and cons of GMM estimators for estimating a model of money demand closely related to the shopping time
model used in this paper.  She also reports that the parameter estimates are highly sensitive to which
instruments are used.29
excluding the 1990s.  The estimated ratio of money balances to consumption m/c at zero
nominal interest rates is 0.22 (compared to 0.24 for the full sample).
The closest antecedent for our paper, Wolman (1997), studies the United States but only
covers the period up to 1992.   Evidence in Ball (1998) suggests that unusually high
narrow money velocity in the 1990s has been a phenomenon in the United States too.  All
this might suggest that there has been a structural break in narrow money demand in the
1990s.  But Ball (1998) argues against this view for the United States for M1.  He argues
that econometric studies of money demand in the United States that exclude the 1990s
give biased estimates of parameters in the money demand function.
Our second robustness check was to look for evidence of a deterministic trend.  A trend
can be motivated by thinking of technical progress in the process by which money
enables consumers to economise on real balances.  Or, put another way, there could be a
trend improvement in the amount of shopping time that a given level of real balances
implies.   This captures the idea that shopping has become easier for consumers,  with
developments such as the growth of superstores, containing a wider range of goods, and
home shopping.  We included a deterministic time trend in equation (4), but found it to be
insignificant and it produced economically implausible parameter estimates.
(17)
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We are left to continue, albeit tentatively, beginning with the assumption that there
appears to be evidence of a satiation point in real balances, just as Wolman (1997) found
for the US, but in contrast to the argument that Lucas (1994) made for a ‘log-log’
specification – which implies non-satiation.  Recall that Chadha et al (op cit) found that
what they call ‘long run money demand’ appears to be ‘log-log’, implying non-satiation
for the UK but that ‘short run’ money demand appears to be ‘semi-log’.  To reiterate our
earlier discussion, our results are not readily comparable with those.  Ours come from
applying an equation from a shopping-time model to data:  the Chadha et al results are
explicitly fitted to the data, with the benefits and costs (already set out in section 2) that
adopting that strategy implies.
3.3 Parameters of the benchmark economy
The welfare analysis will quantify the benefits of moving from some benchmark inflation
rate to the Friedman rule.  So the second stage of the model calibration is to characterise
the benchmark economy.
The inflation rate in the benchmark economy is taken as the average Retail Price Index
(RPI) inflation rate over the 1920-98 sample period.  This comes out as 4.1 per cent.  The
production function is Cobb-Douglas.  We take the 0.44 value for the capital share from
Holland and Scott (1998). The depreciation rate is assumed to be 9 per cent per annum.31
The preference parameters ψ  and β  are set so that the annual real interest rate is 4.5 per
cent and the steady state hours worked is equal to 26.3 per cent of the time endowment,
(calibrated using average hours worked data for manual workers over our sample period -
comparable data for non-manual workers are unavailable for the United Kingdom
(sources are discussed in Appendix 1).  The 4.5 per cent real interest rate is the average
post-tax real rate of return on equities from the Credit Suisse First Boston Equity-Gilt
Study over our sample period.  The riskless real interest rate relevant for calculating the
real opportunity cost of holding money is calibrated at 2.2 per cent.  This is the sample
average nominal interest rate (3.8 per cent) minus the sample average of an ex ante
inflation expectation based on a simple ARMA model (1.6 per cent) - compared to
Wolman’s estimate of 1 per cent.
 (18)  There is no endogenously arising equity risk
premium in the model: there are two distinct real rates calibrated to mimic one.  Our
methodology here parallels Wolman’s.  Note that the assumed riskless real rate of return
is crucial for determining the welfare costs of any given rate of inflation, since it
determines the Friedman rule (which is the negative of this riskless real rate).  But the
elasticity of welfare to changes in steady state inflation and in particular the behavior of
real balances at zero nominal rates will be independent of this assumption.
Given the estimated parameters of the shopping time technology,  the constant of
integration, Ω , is chosen so that the time spent shopping in steady state is equal to 2.8%.
______________________________________________________________________________________
(18) The ARMA model for RPI inflation is estimated up to 1920, and the expectations beyond that
constructed as out-of-sample forecasts.  That the average inflation expectation is some way below the
sample average inflation rate is due to the experience of the 70s, when the model gives us low inflation and
the data give us very high inflation.  We take the stance, therefore, that the 70s was a ‘surprise’.32
This is the average taken from several time budget studies in the United Kingdom
(Gershuny and Robinson (1988),  ONS Omnibus Survey (1995) and Jenkins and O’Leary
(1997)).
4  The impact of low inflation on the demand for money and welfare
Our econometric evidence rejected the null hypothesis of nonsatiation, and provided us
with point estimates of the coefficients of the money demand function.  These estimates
give an estimate of the ratio of nominal money balances to nominal consumption at zero
nominal interest rates, and our estimate of this ratio is 0.24.
19  This in itself does not
provide us with an estimate of the satiation level of nominal balances in current prices.
But using our calibrated model, we can work out how real consumption varies from the
long run average as inflation is reduced to the Friedman rule.  This in turn can be
expressed in current prices, allowing us to compute the current-prices per capita satiation
level of narrow money.  We estimate this to be around £2,000 per person on average
throughout the year, in 1998 prices.  This compares to current per capita holdings of
narrow money of around £450.
20
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/  at R=0 and at our
central coefficient estimates presented in table 1.
(20) One potential criticism of our estimate of the nominal value of the per capita satiation level might be,
since most people hold on average less than £400, the estimate of the satiation level should be scaled down
appropriately.  But note that we do not define the nominal per capita satiation level relative to the average
per capita holdings of money balances, it is defined relative to per capita nominal consumption at the
Friedman rule.  But to the extent that our econometric estimates are based on a level of per capita money
balances in excess of those held by many people, our coefficient estimates may be distorted and hence the
per capita satiation level estimate could be indirectly affected.33
As well as providing an estimate of the nominal per capita satiation level, the general
equilibrium model calibrated to UK data can provide estimates of the welfare costs of
different inflation rates as they are implied by the shopping-time model.  Recall that we
are doing so without a model that captures behaviours that could lead to ‘benefits’ of
inflation that could be set against these costs.  These estimates will serve as a benchmark:
we will then go on to explore uncertainties in the welfare calculation emanating from the
empirical calibration of the money demand function.
The welfare analysis involves using the utility function in the consumer’s problem to
evaluate the returns to different steady state inflation rates.  These returns are expressed
as an answer to the following question:  “what proportion of annual total income would
an individual forego/accept as compensation in order to move to a lower/higher rate of
inflation?”  What we are calling ‘total income’ is the sum of consumption and leisure,
where leisure units are converted into ‘income’ by valuing them at the calibrated effective
real wage under the initial (in our case sample average) inflation rate.  This effective real
wage is the marginal product of labour adjusted for the wedge that the sample inflation
rate drives between the returns to work from the point of view of the firm and the returns
once the shopping-time/real-balance costs of consumption are taken into account.
(21)
Chart 4 below uses the sample average inflation rate as the base for comparison.  It shows
that agents would need slightly less than a 0.1 per cent increase in ‘total income’ to leave34
their welfare unchanged were inflation to fall to the Friedman rule from the sample
average (implying that nominal interest rates fall from their sample average to zero).  Put
another way, welfare would be just under 0.1 per cent higher per period had the history of
the steady-state inflation rate matched the Friedman rule.  Wolman’s figure is higher at












Welfare compared to baseline of 4.1 per 
cent inflation
Per cent
Nominal interest rate (per cent)
Satiation
Chart 5 displays the same information, but records the gain from moving from a nominal
interest rate of x per cent to the Friedman rule (nominal rates at zero).  It also shows these
welfare gains using the estimates of the money demand curve where we impose non-
satiation.
                                                                                                                                                                            
(21) Intuition:  when inflation is above the Friedman rule, the worker cannot transform an hour of work into
the same amount of consumption:  either she holds less real balances, and has to spend more time shopping,
and take less leisure, or she holds the same real balances and loses out because of the erosion in their value.
22  Wolman’s benchmark economy has a slightly different nominal interest rate, though this is unlikely to











Estimated welfare gain from moving 
from x% nominal interest rate to 0%
Nominal interest rate %
With satiation
With nonsatiation
Whether we impose satiation or not, the estimated gains from reducing anticipated
inflation are small:  smaller than the costs Chadha et al (1998), Wolman and Lucas
(2000) found.
One of Wolman’s key results is that the existence of satiation in the money demand curve
determines where the bulk of the results of reducing inflation occur:  he finds that under
satiation the bulk of the gains come in reducing inflation to zero, whereas under
nonsatiation the bulk of the gains come in reducing inflation all the way to the Friedman
rule.  We examined the gains from reducing UK average inflation from 2.5% to 0% and
to the Friedman rule under satiation and non-satiation.  We found that under satiation
57% of the gains of moving to the Friedman rule were realized by moving to zero
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inflation.  Under nonsatiation, a little under 52% of the gain was realized at zero inflation.
Therefore our results differ from Wolman’s in two respects.  Not only are our costs of a
given inflation rate measurably smaller, but we find that the existence of a satiation point
does not have as material an effect on the proportion of welfare gains that accrue by
eliminating the last x percentage points of inflation away from the Friedman rule.  Given
a visual inspection of our chart 5 and the equivalent in Wolman (1997), this is not
surprising.37
5 Uncertainties in the estimates of the welfare costs of inflation
5.1  How does uncertainty about parameter estimates in the money demand function
translate into uncertainty about welfare gains?
In this part of the paper, we turn to look at uncertainties in the welfare costs of inflation
that come from the empirical calibration of the money demand function.  We leave to one
side the uncertainties that would come from errors in the other parts of the model or in the
calibration of those parts of the model, though those errors may be important.  We also
leave to one side the ‘fundamental’ uncertainties about the validity of the shopping-time
specification.   Instead we focus on two issues.  First, supposing the shopping-time model
to be qualitatively correct, how do the bootstrapped distributions for the estimated
parameters in the money demand function translate into distributions for the welfare costs
of inflation?  Second, can we measure the degree to which our inference about satiation
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The first step was to compute 95 per cent confidence bands around our ‘welfare costs of
inflation curve’, based on the uncertainty underlying the estimates of the three parameters
in the money demand function.  The method used to construct the confidence intervals is
described in more detail in Appendix 3.  Briefly, we used the sample distributions of the
money demand parameters generated in the bootstrapping procedure used to conduct
inference in section 2 (and see Appendix 1) as approximations to the true joint probability
density function of the parameters.  The rest of the model was then re-calibrated for each
of a 1000 draws of the parameter triplets, and then the welfare costs of inflation were
computed as before for each of these re-solved models.39
The confidence intervals (around the welfare costs coming from our base case of a
satiated demand curve) are shown in chart 6 above.  Note that the sampled uncertainty
about money demand parameters does not translate into large uncertainties about the
welfare gains of moving from a given inflation rate to the Friedman rule.  This may seem
surprising, but recall that there are other sources of uncertainty in this calculation that we
are ignoring but which could make these bands much larger.  Indeed we might be more
disturbed if the welfare gains were much more sensitive to the shopping time function
parameters than to the inflation rate.  The error bands are probably small enough to
enable us to infer, given all the other maintained assumptions in the model, that the
profile of welfare costs accruing away from the Friedman rule are significantly different
from the United States.  But this is an important ‘given’:  it is likely that the other sources
of uncertainty we have put to one side make it hard to draw this conclusion from our
study of money-demand related uncertainties alone.
5.2  The impact of the lack of observations at low nominal interest rates on the hypothesis
test for satiation
Another dimension of uncertainty is whether researchers can make accurate inference
about satiation in real balances.  Economies have spent little or no time, Japan excepted,
at zero nominal interest rates.  Intuitively, if we are trying to detect whether real balances
tend to a finite number or not at zero balances, one might imagine that our ability to do
this would be greater, the closer to and more frequent were our nominal interest rate data40
to zero.  In the extreme, an economy that was pushed to a steady state at zero nominal
interest rates would either manifest infinite real balances or it wouldn’t.
To explore how our inference might be impaired by having few observations near zero
nominal rates, we set up the following kind of ‘Monte Carlo’experiment:  generate some
artificial data on real balances and nominal interest rates based on a model;  add to it
some random noise;  run a regression like (4) on that model data, and on many other data
sets generated in the same way;  conduct hypothesis tests on φ ;  see how often you get the
right answer;  strip out observations with nominal interest rates below a threshold value
and see how often the regression gives you the right answer;  and so on, increasing the
threshold for nominal interest rates, recording how the frequency of correct inference
changes as the sample shrinks.   In each case we began with data generated for a uniform
distribution of nominal interest rates between 0 and 14 per cent (our sample maximum for
the United Kingdom) in steps of one basis point.
Chart 7 contains our results for the case when the true model has satiation.  To explain,
take the line labeled ‘se=0.03’.  This line sets the variance of the noise added to the
generated money demand observations to 0.03, approximately the variance of the
residuals in our fitted money demand curve for the UK described in section 3.  The y-axis
records the power of our satiation test;  the proportion of the 1000 regressions where we41
make the correct inference about the satiation point from the t-ratio on φ
23:  specifically,
the amount of times we reject H0: φ =0 at the five per cent significance level, or
equivalently one minus the probability of a type 2 error.  The x-axis indicates the lower
threshold for nominal interest rates in the sample.  For a threshold value of 1 per cent, we
have stripped out all observations with interest rates below this before running the
regression and the hypothesis test.  So the ‘se=0.03’ line shows how the power of the test
falls from one initially, to around 0.3 at a threshold value of 0.5 per cent, which is the
lowest observation for nominal interest rates in our UK sample.  This shows very clearly
how econometricians will find it harder to conclude that there is satiation, even if the true
model exhibits it, the further is the lowest nominal interest rate observation from zero.
This result makes our finding (and Wolman’s) all the more striking.  Note too that the
greater the noise in the data, the more we are dependent on low interest rate observations
to make good inference (or, in terms of the chart, the earlier is the point along the x-axis
that the power falls off).
______________________________________________________________________________________
23 Note that our artificial data sets have 1000 observations so we can rely on the asymptotic properties of
NLLS estimators and use the t-ratios for inference, rather than using bootstrapped errors as we did for the
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We can explore why the power falls off as we strip the sample of low interest rates, and
why this fall-off is related to the variance of the error term.  Re-writing the regression
(17):
(17)  () t
v














Compare this to the specification when nonsatiation is imposed:
(20)  t t t Ax y ε
ν + =43
There are two situations in which testing specification (19) will lead us to accept the
restricted model (20).  One is when our sample estimate of φ  is close enough to zero to be
thought of as statistically insignificantly different from zero- as would be expected.  The
other is when the ratio φ /xt is very close to zero.  But as the nominal interest rate increases
xt also increases, and so the bracketed term in specification (19) will tend to 1, making
this model look very like the specification under satiation, especially when an additive
disturbance confuses the picture.
Our estimate of φ  was 0.0016, and the sample average deposit rate was about 3.75%.  Our
(satiated) model implies that at this level of deposit rates, the average xt is an order of
magnitude larger than φ  ie around 0.01, and we may reasonably expand the bracketed



















For nominal interest rates near the sample average, and based on our parameter estimates,
the second term would be a factor of 1,000 smaller than the first term due to the term φν .
If the error term has a standard error sufficiently large, the term involving φ  will be
swamped at moderate interest rates.44
Turn now to our tests when the true model is nonsatiated (φ =0).   In the same way as
before, we explore our inference on the null hypothesis that there is nonsatiation as we
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The chart shows that the significance level (the chance of rejecting H0: φ =0 when H0 is
true) falls as we increase the lower bound.  Moreover, it falls off more quickly the greater
is the variance in the error term.
24  So, just as with our first experiment, the higher is the
floor to interest rates, the more our tests are biased towards finding nonsatiation.  In this
example, we chose to test a hypothesis that was actually true, so here the sample stripping
acts to help us reach the right answer.  But note that this is fortuitous.  The chance of
correctly rejecting a range of false hypotheses about positive values of φ  (the power, in
______________________________________________________________________________________
24 The significance level generated when the standard error equals 0.1 is drawn on the chart, but is
approximately zero whatever the lower bound.45
other words) is falling as the floor to nominal interest rates rises, just as in the first
experiment in Chart 7.
To summarise, chart 7 shows that when satiation is true, if you do not have low nominal
interest rate observations, then there is a low probability of rejecting non-satiation.  In
contrast, chart 8 shows that when non-satiation is true, even if you do not have low
nominal interest rate observations, then there is still a low probability of rejecting non-
satiation.  So if there is non-satiation you should find it even with a small number of low
interest rate observations.  But if there is satiation it is difficult to find this in the data if
there are a small number of low interest rate observations.  That asymmetry in our Monte
Carlo simulations should make us (and Wolman) even more confident in our results
finding satiation.
If we were prepared to assume that the basics of the general equilibrium model we use
are correct, and that the shopping-time model in particular is correct, we could draw some
comfort from these experimental tests:  namely, by noting that both ourselves and
Wolman (1997) managed to find satiation in money balances even though, as we have
shown, the tests for satiation may be biased towards finding the opposite when the sample
has few near-zero interest rate data.
Regardless, these results show that our inference about satiation may be severely
hampered by the fact that it is based on datasets with few observations close to zero
nominal rates.  On the face of it, that it may be difficult (or impossible) to decide between46
the two models would seem to matter more for the United States, for which Wolman
found satiation changed the costs of staying x per cent away from the Friedman rule quite
a lot, than for the UK.  This is true with one important qualification.  Whether real
balances tend to infinity at zero nominal interest rates may be important for policymakers
engaged in monetary policy in a dynamic setting, the costs of steady state inflation aside.
Were a shock large to arrive that was large enough to require a stabilising monetary
impulse which was in turn large enough to drive nominal interest rates to the region of
zero, how/ whether monetary policy could work would depend in part on whether there is
a satiation point in real balances.  Recent contributions by Goodfriend(1999) and
McCallum(1999) meditate on the legitimacy of, and the policy options in the face of, a
zero nominal bound to interest rates in more detail.
6. Conclusions
The literature on calculating the welfare costs of inflation is now a large one.  Our
increment to it is as follows:-  First, we have presented a ‘general equilibrium’ estimate
of a subset of the costs of inflation for the UK, and contrasted this with a similarly
derived estimate by Wolman (1997) for the US.  (Our estimated costs were smaller).
They were ‘general equilibrium’ estimates in the sense that, as suggested by the chosen
(shopping-time) model, they accounted for the distortion to consumption, work and
leisure decisions and constructed using an explicit utility function for the representative47
consumer:  in this sense they departed from the tradition established by Bailey (1956)
through Lucas (1994) and recently Chadha et al (1998) of treating money as a
consumption good and measuring the welfare costs of inflation by integrating under a
money demand curve (of varying coherence with theory).  This general equilibrium
estimate is interesting in so far as it can be used to set against the features of an economy
(not modelled here) which could generate an optimal inflation rate away from the
Friedman rule.
Our second increment to the literature was to show how the empirical money-demand
uncertainties translated into uncertainties about those general equilibrium welfare costs.
We showed that the variances around the central estimates of the parameters in our
money demand function do not translate into large uncertainties about those welfare costs
of inflation we capture.  We showed that in economies with few or no observations of
nominal interest rates close to zero it may be very difficult to make good inference about
whether real money holdings tend to some finite number or not as nominal rates go to
zero.  In the United States this matters quite a lot for figuring out the welfare costs of
staying at an inflation rate x per cent away from the Friedman rule.  In the UK it does not.
But this uncertainty about the existence of a satiation point in money demand is important
for the task of assessing the (gross) benefits of higher inflation.48
Appendices
Appendix 1:  Data and sources
Consumption.
Source:  ONS, Sefton and Weale (1995).  Consumption data are in current prices and
seasonally adjusted.  After 1955, the series is AIIX from the ONS National Accounts.
Prior to this, the series is from Sefton and Weale (1995), Table A2, consumers
expenditure 1920-1990.
Nominal average earnings
Source:  ONS, Liesner (1985), British Labour Statistics (1968).  Between 1963 and 1998
the source is ONS.  From 1990 onwards, the series is LNMQ, whole economy average
earnings, seasonally adjusted.  Between 1963 and 1990 the average earnings series is
DNHS.  Between 1940 and 1963, the series is from Liesner (1985), ‘Average weekly
earnings of manual workers’.  Between 1920 and 1968 the series is from British Labour
Statistics (1971) ‘All manual workers, all industries and services’.
Deposit rate
Source:  Bank of England, Capie and Weber (1985).  From 1983 to 1998 this series is
AJNR from Financial Statistics .  Prior to this it is from the Bank Of England Statistical
Abstract 7 day deposit rate, and before this from Capie and Weber (1985) Interest on
deposit accounts.49
Monetary base
Source:  Capie and Weber (1985), Bank of England.  Prior to 1982 this the monetary base
series from Capie and Weber.  Post 1982 the growth rate of M0 is used to project this
series forward.
Population
Source:  ONS, Mitchell (1988).
Post versus pre-tax data?
Note that we use pre-tax data.  A strict interpretation of the shopping time model would
require using post-tax wages as this is the appropriate measure of the opportunity cost of
leisure and shopping.  (An even stricter application would be to model the government
tax and expenditure choices, and their impact on consumers’ marginal decisions
explicitly).  But, in practice, we do not have average marginal income tax rates
(‘effective’ tax rates) for labour income going back over our sample period.  One option
is to use the basic rate of income tax (that we do have for the whole sample period) as a
proxy for the ‘effective’ rates.  We choose not to do that here:  the basic rate of income
tax does not even cointegrate with the effective tax rates data we have for different
household types for the 1948-82 sub-sample from Dilnot et al (1984).  So using the basic
rate would be a poor proxy for the effective rates in our steady state analysis.  In the
absence of a suitable effective tax rate series we use the pre-tax wage.  Wolman (1997)
finds that using post-tax wages instead of pre-tax wages makes little difference to his
results for the United States.50
Appendix 2:  Bootstrapping procedure to generate sampling distributions for
parameters in the money demand function, taken from Wolman (1999)
The bootstrapping procedure is done in three stages.  First, equation (4) is estimated using
NLLS.  The residuals exhibit significant serial correlation.  This is a general property of
empirical money demand functions - even when a lagged dependent variable is included
- see Goodfriend (1985) and Laidler (1985).  The second stage is to fit an AR model to
the residuals, producing a new set of whitened residuals.
(25)  The final stage is to draw
randomly (with replacement, that is, leaving the chance of drawing a particular residual
the same, regardless of whether that value has already been drawn) from the population
of whitened residuals.  With each draw from the whitened residuals,  we put back in the
serial correlation from the AR model to give a new residual with the same serial
correlation properties as the residual in stage 1.  Combined with the parameter estimates
from stage 1 and the original  t x data (the composite consumption, wage, nominal interest
rate series) we can then use the new residuals to construct a series for
~
t y (real balances).
For each newly constructed value of  
~
t y  we re-run NLLS to generate a different estimate




(25) In fact an AR (1) model fitted the residuals reasonably well.
(26) In fact, the bootstrapping procedure generates a joint sampling distribution of A, φ  and υ .51
Appendix 3:  computing the 95% confidence bands
Recall the description of the bootstrapping procedure in Appendix 2.  We artificially
generated a set of 1000 triplets of the parameters A, φ  and ν .  This provided a sample
distribution showing the relative frequencies of φ , which we took to be an approximation
to the true joint probability density function.  Similarly we have the sampling
distributions of A and ν .  So for any given inflation rate can draw a triple A,φ ,ν  from
these sampling distributions to parameterise a money demand function.  We would need
to calibrate ψ  and Ω  (defined in section 3.3) specifically for this paramerisation of the
money demand function (and the other, unchanged benchmark parameters) and then
compute the welfare gain in moving from the inflation rate x to the Friedman rule.  We
repeated this for 1000 parameterisations of the money demand function.  This provides
1000 estimates of the welfare gain associated with that inflation rate.  Taking these
observations to be the sampling distribution, the 2.5 per cent and 97.5 per cent critical
values can be obtained, representing a confidence interval around the central estimate.
Repeating this for the range of inflation rates generates a confidence band around the
central estimate.52
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